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Abstract
We merge two methodologies, prospective measures of population aging and probabilistic
population forecasts. We compare the speed of change and variability in forecasts of the old
age dependency ratio and the prospective old age dependency ratio as well as the same
comparison for the median age and the prospective median age. While conventional mea-
sures of population aging are computed on the basis of the number of years people have
already lived, prospective measures are computed also taking account of the expected
number of years they have left to live. Those remaining life expectancies change over time
and differ from place to place. We compare the probabilistic distributions of the conventional
and prospective measures using examples from China, Germany, Iran, and the United
States. The changes over time and the variability of the prospective indicators are smaller
than those that are observed in the conventional ones. A wide variety of new results emerge
from the combination of methodologies. For example, for Germany, Iran, and the United
States the likelihood that the prospective median age of the population in 2098 will be lower
than it is today is close to 100 percent.
Introduction
Population aging poses widely discussed policy challenges [1–4]. The United Nations publishes
probabilistic forecasts of three measures of population aging, the old-age dependency ratio, the
total dependency ratio, and the potential support ratio [5]. These provide information about
the likely extent and uncertainty of population aging on the national level and so provide the
basis for policy and academic analyses.
Probabilistic population forecasts were motivated by Keyfitz [6]. Keyfitz wrote:
“Demographers can no more be held responsible for the inaccuracy in forecasting pop-
ulation 20 years ahead than geologists, meteorologists, or economists when they fail to
announce earthquakes, cold winters, or depressions 20 years ahead. What we can be held
responsible for is warning one another and our public what the error of our estimates is
likely to be.” (p. 579).
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There is now an extensive literature of probabilistic forecasting [7–18]. All the probabilistic
measures of aging produced by the United Nations assume that the threshold of old age is a
fixed chronological age, regardless of time, place, education, or other characteristics of people.
Ryder [19](page 16) questioned this assumption. He wrote:
“To the extent that our concern with age is what it signifies about the degree of deterioration
and dependence, it would seem sensible to consider the measurement of age not in terms of
years elapsed since birth but rather in terms of the number of years remaining until death.”
Ryder suggested the old age threshold be defined on the basis of some plausible remaining
life expectancy rather than any specific chronological age. Sanderson and Scherbov [20,21]
extended and generalized Ryder’s idea. They defined characteristic-equivalent ages as chrono-
logical ages at which a measure of some characteristic is held constant. We call the ages, that
are obtained when life expectancy is the characteristic that is held constant, prospective ages
and measures that use them prospective measures of population aging. In this paper, we merge
two methodologies, probabilistic population forecasting based on a Bayesian hierarchical
model [9] and prospective ages to produce new probabilistic forecasts of aging.
New measures of population aging are useful because tomorrow’s older people will not be
like today’s. They may well have longer life expectancies [22,23], better cognition [24], better
education [25], and fewer severe disabilities [26]. In most OECD countries, the labor force par-
ticipation of people 65+ years old is increasing [27] as are the ages at which people can receive
a normal national pension [28,29]. Since changes in the characteristics of people are ignored in
the conventional measures of aging, they become more outdated with the passage of time. The
use of prospective ages is one way to create measures of aging that are more in line with
observable changes.
Prospective ages can be used in a wide variety of contexts in the study of population aging.
Here we use them in two ways. First, we follow Ryder and define the threshold of old age
based on a remaining life expectancy rather than a fixed chronological age. We chose a
remaining life expectancy of 15 years. That was the life expectancy at age 65 in many low mor-
tality countries around 1970.
In Fig 1, we show estimated and forecasted old age thresholds based on a remaining life
expectancy of 15 years for China, Germany, Iran and the US for the years 2013 through 2098.
In 2013, the old age threshold was 66 in China and 72 in Germany. By 2098, the old age thresh-
old is forecasted to increase to 79 in Germany and 77 in China.
In the second application of prospective ages we modify the conventional median age
[20,21]. Instead of reporting median ages in terms of chronological ages, we report them in
terms of prospective ages. For example, Table 1 shows the median age and the prospective
median age of the US population from 2013 to 2098, as well as the remaining life expectancy at
the median age. In Table 1, we use the life table of the US in 2013 as a reference. The prospec-
tive median age standardizes the median age for changes in life expectancy. In particular, the
prospective median age is the age in the reference life table where remaining life expectancy is
the same as at the median age in the specified year. The median age in the US in 2013 was 37.6
years. At that time the remaining life expectancy of people 37.6 years old was 43.0 years. In
2098, the median age is forecasted to increase by 6.9 years to 44.5 and the remaining life expec-
tancy is also expected to rise from 43.0 to 45.4. In 2013, the base year for the calculation of the
prospective median age, people had a remaining life expectancy of 45.4 years at age 35.1.
Therefore, the prospective median age in the US in 2098 is 35.1. People in the US at the median
age in 2098 are expected to be older than the people at the median age in 2013 but, neverthe-
less, have a longer remaining life expectancy.
Probabilistic population aging
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Materials and methods
We drew for each country a systematic subsample of one thousand random trajectories from
the 10,000 that were the basis of the UN’s 2015 probabilistic population projections. Each tra-
jectory included the age structure of the population at 5 year intervals starting in 2015 and
abridged life tables for five year intervals from 2015–2020 to 2095–2100 combining data for
both sexes. Conventional measures were computed at the midpoint of the 5 year intervals
and prospective measures were computed applying the corresponding life tables to those
populations.
Fig 1. Old age threshold based on a remaining life expectancy of 15 years. Source: UN (2015) and authors’ calcuations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179171.g001
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The old age threshold used in the computation of the prospective proportion of the popula-
tion who are old and the prospective old age dependency ratio is derived from the equation:
oatj;t ¼ e
  1
j;t ð15Þ;
where oatj,t is the old age threshold in country j in year t and e  1j;t ð15Þ is the age in the life table
for country j in year t where remaining life expectancy is equal to 15 years.
The prospective median age in country j in year t is derived from the equation:
pmaj;t ¼ e
  1
j;2013½ej;tðmaj;tÞ;
where pmaj,t is the prospective median age in country j in year t, maj,t is the median age in
country j in year t, ej,t(maj,t) is the life expectancy in the life table for country j and year t at the
median age of the population in that year, and e  1j;2013½ej;tðmaj;tÞ is the age in the country’s life
table of 2013, where remaining life expectancy is the same as at the median age in year t.
Results
Figs 2–5 present measures of population aging for four countries, China, Germany, Iran, and
the US. Each figure has six panels. The panels on the left-hand side show three measures of
aging that are based on chronological ages. The topmost shows the probabilistic distribution
of the proportion of the population who are 65+ years old. The middle graph presents the dis-
tribution of the old age dependency ratio (OADR), defined as the ratio of people 65+ years old
to those 20–64 years old. The bottom graph shows the distribution of the median age of the
population.
The graphs on the right side present analogous measures that utilize prospective ages. In
the topmost graph the onset of old age is defined using a prospective age instead of the fixed
Table 1. Median age, prospective median age, and remaining life expectancy at the median age: USA, 2013–2098.
country year Median Age (MA) Prospective Median Age (PMA) Remaining Life Expectancy at the Median Age (RLE at MA)
USA 2013 37.6 37.6 43.0
USA 2018 38.3 37.7 42.9
USA 2023 38.9 37.7 42.9
USA 2028 39.7 37.8 42.8
USA 2033 40.4 37.9 42.7
USA 2038 41.0 37.8 42.8
USA 2043 41.3 37.5 43.1
USA 2048 41.6 37.1 43.5
USA 2053 41.8 36.7 43.8
USA 2058 41.9 36.4 44.2
USA 2063 42.2 36.1 44.4
USA 2068 42.6 36.0 44.5
USA 2073 43.0 35.9 44.6
USA 2078 43.3 35.7 44.7
USA 2083 43.6 35.5 44.9
USA 2088 43.9 35.4 45.1
USA 2093 44.2 35.2 45.3
USA 2098 44.5 35.1 45.4
Source: UN (2015) and authors’ calculations
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179171.t001
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Fig 2. Probabilistic forecasts for three aging measures based on chronological ages and three based on prospective ages, China
2013–2098. Source: UN (2015) and authors’ calculations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179171.g002
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age 65. In that graph, the threshold of old age is set to the age at which remaining life expec-
tancy was 15 years. In the middle graph on the right, the prospective old age dependency ratio
is defined as the ratio of people at or above the prospective threshold age to the number of peo-
ple between 20 and the prospective threshold age. The prospective median age in the bottom
Fig 3. Probabilistic forecasts for three aging measures based on chronological ages and three based on
prospective ages, Germany 2013–2098. Source: UN (2015) and authors’ calculations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179171.g003
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right graph is the age in 2013 (taken here as the base year) where remaining life expectancy is
the same as at the median age in the indicated year.
Prospective proportions of the population who are old and prospective old age dependency
ratios (POADR) are lower in 2013 than their counterparts that use age 65 as the old age
Fig 4. Probabilistic forecasts for three aging measures based on chronological ages and three based on
prospective ages, Iran 2013–2098. Source: UN (2015) and authors’ calculations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179171.g004
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threshold because the age at which remaining life expectancy was 15 years was above age 65.
The prospective measures also grow less rapidly. The probabilistic forecasts also reveal a differ-
ence in the standard deviations of the forecasts.
Fig 5. Probabilistic forecasts for three aging measures based on chronological ages and three based on
prospective ages, USA 2013–2098. Source: UN (2015) and authors’ calculations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0179171.g005
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The standard deviations of the forecasts of the prospective proportion of the population
who are old and the prospective old age dependency ratios (POADR) are less than their coun-
terparts that do not use prospective ages. In Germany and the US, the standard deviation of
the POADR in 2058 was 0.01, while the standard deviations of their OADRs in that year were
0.05 and 0.03 respectively. In China, the analogous numbers are 0.03 for their POADR and
0.06 for their OADR. In the case of Iran the difference between the standard deviation of the
POADR and the OADR is smaller, being 0.04 and 0.05 respectively.
The standard deviations of the POADR remain relatively small even to the end of the cen-
tury. In 2098, the standard deviation was 0.05 for China, 0.03 for Germany, and 0.02 for the
US. Indeed, in the US, the 90 percent prediction interval for the POADR in 2098 was between
0.18 and 0.25. In Iran, uncertainty with respect to the POADR in 2098 was much higher than
in the other three countries. The standard deviation there was much higher, 0.13.
The distributions of the four measures look different for Iran than for the other three coun-
tries. Iran experienced one of the most rapid decreases in fertility in history during the 1980s
[30]. The resulting waves in the population age structure propagate over time and produce the
uncertainties that we see in Fig 4, which are larger than for any of the other countries. China
also had a rapid fertility decline, which occurred somewhat earlier than Iran’s, which lead to
an irregular age distribution, as well. The large irregularities in the age structures in Iran and
China contributed to the large observed uncertainties in the prospective measures.
Turning to the median age and the prospective median age, we see that while the median
age either rises or remains roughly constant over time, the prospective median age actually
falls. The decline begins earliest in the US, where the peak prospective median age is 37.8 at
around 2038. The prospective median age then falls to 35.0 by 2098. The decline in prospective
median age begins slightly later in Germany where it falls from 46.5 in 2043 to 40.1 in 2098.
The decline in China begins around 2048 and around 2073 in Iran. By 2098, Iran has the high-
est median age and prospective median age among the four countries. In contrast to the case
for the OADR and the POADR, the standard deviations of the prospective median age tend to
be about the same as for the median age.
Discussion
Each of the trajectories that we use is computed using assumptions about the paths of fertility
and mortality rates. In the four countries that we are considering infant and child mortality
rates are already quite low at our starting date in 2013, so most of the increase in life expec-
tancy arises because of future increases in survival at upper ages. Some probabilistic trajecto-
ries will tend to have higher life expectancies and other lower ones. The life expectancies are
auto-correlated, so that a trajectory with a higher than average life expectancy in one year has a
greater probability of having a higher than average life expectancy in the following year. On
trajectories that, on average, have higher life expectancies, the number of people aged 65+ is
higher and therefore, so is the proportion of the population 65+ and the old age dependency
ratio.
When we consider the prospective proportion of the population who are old and the pro-
spective old age dependency ratio, there is another factor at work. Populations with higher
numbers of 65+ year olds have, on average, higher life expectancies, and, therefore, higher old
age thresholds. Higher old age thresholds decrease both the prospective proportion old and
the old age dependency ratio. Thus, higher life expectancies produce two offsetting effects on
the prospective measures.
The same factors that affect the relationship between the OADR and the POADR affect the
relationship between the median age and the prospective median age. One difference is that
Probabilistic population aging
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the prospective median age uses the median age as an input, while the POADR does not use
the OADR as an input. Since the prospective median age uses the median age as an input, the
distribution of median ages in a given year is one component of the distribution of prospective
median ages. In addition to the uncertainty in the median age, the prospective median age also
is affected by variations in prospective ages resulting from differences in life tables.
We can draw several conclusions from this analysis. First, prospective measures of aging
are both lower than their conventional counterparts and they increase more slowly or even
decrease. Second, prospective measures generally have smaller standard deviations than those
based only on chronological age.
The third conclusion is that most of the aging that we measure in China, Germany, and the
US occurs between now and around 2040. In the case of Iran, it continues to around 2060. In
Germany, the prospective old age dependency ratio is forecasted to be around 0.22 in 2018. By
2038, the median prospective old age dependency ratio rises to 0.29 with a 90 percent predic-
tion interval from 0.26 to 0.32. By 2098, the median prospective old age dependency ratio falls
to 0.26 with a 90 percent prediction interval from 0.22 to 0.32. Put differently, in 2018, we
would expect there to be around 4.5 people from age 20 to the old age threshold per person at
or above the old age threshold. By 2038, when aging measures would nearly be at their maxi-
mum, the 90 percent prediction interval is between 3.1 and 3.8.
The probabilistic forecasts show that it is highly likely that the prospective median age of
the population of Germany and the US will be lower in 2098 than it is today. Even in China
there is around a 50 percent chance that the prospective median age will be lower at the end of
the century than it is today. It is possible that people’s concern about the future is related to the
number of additional years they expect to live. Lower prospective median ages in 2098 than
now indicate that the people at the median age will have even more years of additional life
ahead of them than people at the median age have currently.
Policy-makers and others who want to understand and prepare for the future need appro-
priate data to guide them. Measures of population aging that do not take the changing charac-
teristics of people into account do not provide this. Probabilistic prospective measures of
population can provide the kinds of information that is needed.
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